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ABSTRACT
The pricing of items of construction work using Component Unit
Pricing (CUP) Theory requires that contractors have to assess and
quantify their risk profiles. Those contractors with a willingness to
take on greater risks can then be rewarded with a prospect of greater
profits. CUP Theory provides a basis by which this can be
accomplished by way of the manner and extent to which contractors
spread their overall bid prices amongst all of the constituent
component item prices. Conversely, this theory also facilitates that
contractors who want to moderate their exposure to risk are able to
do so, independently of any adjustment they might choose to make
to their overall mark-ups. Contractors are, however, typically
unaware of their risk profiles and will not have had these assessed.
There are no universally accepted or popular methods established for
the assessment of the risk profiles of firms operating within the
construction industry. Bayesian networking (BN) is gaining popularity
in the financial management arena as a sophisticated statistical
approach for the assessment and management of risks. It is
envisaged that it might serve well for evaluating and explaining
contractors' risk profiles as well as facilitate a process by which these
can be reviewed and modified in line with inevitable changes over
time. Against this contextual backdrop this paper provides an
overview as to how BNs can be used to improve the risk profiles of
contractors.
INTRODUCTION
New methods of item pricing have identified prospects of considerable
additional profits for contractors, relative to the default scenario of
'balanced bid' pricing (Cattell, 2012). Item pricing (in the sense of
deciding the distribution of the overall project price amongst the
constituent items by way of their unit prices) does, however, affect
the contractor's exposure to risk. Component Unit Pricing (CUP)
Theory provides a basis to facilitate the estimation of both the
expected profit and the risk of any pricing scenario (Cattell, 2012).
The modelling of profit and risk serves to guide this decision. As is
typical of many financial analyses, a wide spectrum of alternative (in
this case, pricing) scenarios can be identified in which each can have
quite-considerably different risks and rewards associated with them.
Markowitz's Modern Portfolio Theory (1990) suggests that most of
these options should be discarded and that a small subset of these
can be filtered out (which Markowitz declared as the 'efficient' ones)
that render all of the others as comparatively unattractive, illogical
choices. Efficient pricing scenarios offer the most expected profit
relative to their risk, and correspondingly also the least risk for that
degree of expected profit. There should be no reason for a contractor
not to want to adopt one of these sets of prices. This process of
filtering out all of the inefficient pricing scenarios can significantly
reduce the options and help refine and focus the decision that has to
be made, but it still leaves a wide spectrum of choice. These range
from ones that yield the appeal of low-risk (albeit with the
expectation of only low profits) through to the appeal of high-profit
yields (with high risks though). All of these Efficient choices are
logically appealing choices and there is genuine prospect for a
rational justification for any one of these. There is no obvious
preference for one of these over the others, unless and until the
contractors take account of their risk profile. If, for instance, the
contractor has an appetite for high risks, their best (high-yielding)
choice will become more obvious. Thus, any such analysis needs to
be based on knowledge of the contractor's attitude to risk, else no
single pricing decision will emerge as being optimal.
This nature of decision in the mainstream commercial arena (having
no particular reference to construction nor to the aspect of pricing)
has been thoroughly researched in recent decades with (Nobel-prize
winning) leadership by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Their field of
Prospect Theory, and its various derivatives, are based on recognition
that, with knowledge of the 'risk profile' of each economic player, the
objective can be identified as the maximisation of any such player's
derived Utility, recognising that this entails some combination of
maximising profit whilst simultaneously seeing to minimise risk.
There is no known history of determining the risk profiles of
construction contractors. It is hereby suggested that the field of
Bayesian networks (BN) may be appropriate for doing so, especially
during the tender process. In this instance 'price certainty' becomes
a fallacy as complete drawings and bills of quantities are generally
not available when a project goes to tender. The pressure to
complete contract documentation and go to tender at the earliest
date is a common cause of problems in modern projects (Tilley and
McFallan, 2000). As a result, very few projects are completed within
their tender price (Rowlinson, 1999).
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
A Bayesian Network is a way of describing the relationships between
cause and effects and is comprised of nodes and arcs as noted in
Figure 1. The arcs in a BN represent a 'causal' or 'influential'
relationship between variables. Thus, 'Incomplete' contract
documents can cause and/or influence both contractor A and B to
submit uncompetitive tenders due to potential risks. A key feature of
BNs is that it can enable uncertainty to be modelled. In the simple
example presented, incomplete documents do not imply that an
uncompetitive tender is submitted, but there is an increased
probability it could be high.
This information is captured for the node in the Node Probability
Table (NPT) presented in Table 1. The NPT provides the conditional
probability of each possible outcome given each combination of
outcomes for its parent nodes. In this case of 'contractor B' providing
an uncompetitive bid has one parent node "incomplete contract
documents'. Table 1 reveals the probability contractor B will be...
•	uncompetitive, given a situation where the contract documentation
is incomplete, is 0.8;
•	not uncompetitive, given that there is incomplete documentation is
0.2;
•	uncompetitive, given that the probability that the documentation is
complete is 0.1; and
•	not uncompetitive, given that the probability the documentation is
complete is 0.9.
Figure 1. Simple BN
Table 1. NPT for an uncompetitive tender for contractor B.
Incomplete Contract
Documents
False True
False 0.9 0.2
True 0.1 0.8
In the case of contractor A having an uncompetitive tender is
presented in Table 2. Here, the situation describing contractor A has
two parents involved and so the number of combinations of parent
states is four rather than two. The NPTs for the root nodes are
presented in Table 3. In the case of the root nodes there are only
two possible values 'true' or 'false'.
Table 2. NPT for an uncompetitive tender for contractor A
Contractor A's
High Tender Price
False True
Incomplete
Contract
Documents
False True False True
False 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
True 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8
Table 3. NPTs for the root nodes
NPT for incomplete
documents
False 0.9
True 0.1
Contractor A's high tender
price
False 0.6
True 0.4
There are several ways in which probabilities can be determined in
any of the tables. For example, the NPT for 'incomplete contract
documents' reflects the same as for previously observed frequencies
for incomplete documentation for previous projects. Alternatively, if
no such statistical data is available then subjective probabilities can
be used. A key feature of BNs is that they can cater for subjective
probabilities and those based upon objective data. To determine if
contractor B's tender is uncompetitive, then intuitively, the
probability of incomplete contract documents must have increased
from its prior value of 0.1. The question is in this instance by how
much? Using Bayes Theorem, which is defined as:
=	Eq.i
From the NPT it is known that P(/V|7) = 0.8 and that P{T) = 0.1.
Thus, the numerator in Bayes Theorem, in this instance, is 0.08. The
denominator, P(/V) is referred to as an unconditional probability that
contractor B is uncompetitive. This essentially means the probability
contractor B is uncompetitive when no specific information about the
completeness of the documentation is provided. The NPTs do not
provide this value directly, but it can be derived indirectly using the
following equation:
PiN) = P{N\T)PiT) + P(/V|~r)P(~7")	Eq.2
Thus, P(/V)= 0.8(0.1) + 0.1(0.9), which = 0.17. Substituting this
derived value of P(N) into Eq.l then P{T\N) = 0.08/0.17 = 0.471.
The observation that contractor B is uncompetitive significantly
increases that the contract documentation is incomplete (an increase
from 0.1 to 0.471). Contractor A is conditioned by two events so to
also determine if they are uncompetitive. O is introduced to represent
their high tender price. Thus the marginal probability for contractor A
being uncompetitive is:
P{M) = P{M\T,0)P{T)P{0)
+PiM\T, ~0)P(T)P(~0)
+P(M|~7/0)P(~r)P(0)
+P(N|~7, ~0)P(~r)P(~0)	Eq.3
Thus, P(/v/) = 0.032 + 0.036 + 0.216 + 0.162, which =0.446.
The revised marginal P{T) = 0.471 and thus P(~T) = 0.529. Using the
values in the equation above, the observation that contractor B is
also uncompetitive has also increased the probability that contractor
A is uncompetitive.
Notice that Bayeslan networks cater for causal-effect relationships
that are discrete (true or false) and also all those that entail
continuous-scale probabilities. For instance, it does not necessarily
follow, for certain, that because the sun is now shining that it won't
be raining this afternoon. The fact that the sun is shining might
lessen the odds of it raining this afternoon, but it does not discount
the possibility altogether. Nevertheless, knowing that the sun is now
shining may be useful knowledge if one is trying to determine the
likelihood of rain this afternoon. It is presumably more likely to rain
soon if it is cloudy than if it is sunny. Furthermore, other
observations may also be useful in predicting rain this afternoon,
such as how often it has rained recently, and particularly so during
the hours of the afternoon, and how frequently it rains at this time of
year, based on a statistical analysis of the climate over many years.
BN facilitate that all this data can be taken into account when
predicting rain as well as perhaps the opinions of local experts and of
meteorologists.
In terms of construction, a project may be more likely to be delayed
if its foundations are being built in the rainy season than in a dry
season. However, it does not follow that if the project is being built
in a wet season that it will definitely be delayed or that if it is being
built in a dry season that it will not be. BNs appear to be very good
at dealing with situations like this, particularly when the models
involved are complex and comprise many such variables / causes,
interconnected in a wide variety of ways. It can accept data as
regards these causal-effect connections in ways that make them
practical to implement. For instance, some of these probabilities
could be informed by way of statistical analyses of past projects and
others could be informed by way of expert opinion. Combinations of
several such inputs are also possible. As mentioned above, 'soft'
subjective opinions can be interspersed with 'hard' relatively-
indisputable objective data. Gaps in knowledge can be easily filled.
Benefits of BNs
BN enjoys several significant benefits that are noteworthy. Firstly,
they facilitate being reviewed on a dynamic basis. As new data
arises, networks can be updated and new output generated, typically
without even having to recalculate the entire network but rather only
by way of focussing on those areas that are affected. Secondly, BN
are structured that they are transparent and auditable, and do not
function as opaque 'black boxes'. They explain how the end result is
accomplished and what the significant contributions were, that gave
rise to this. Thus they facilitate that these most-sensitive variables
can then be reviewed and refined in the light of the discovery of their
significance. Thirdly, they facilitate 'back-propagation', or in other
words, they can fairly-easily show what input values might be that
would generate any desired output. These attributes encourage
modellers to be able to dive in and gain greater insight into how and
why their models are operating than if they were simply a one-way
opaque black-box in which some input simply (in some unknown
manner) leads to the desired output. BN is, by contrast, a dynamic
and flexible beast that invites one to engage with and play with it.
It is proposed that BN appears well suited for the purpose of
assessing a contractor's risk profile. Risk profiles are typically derived
from interviews. These interviews entail participants having to choose
between options to the extent that the process can identify their
'indifference map'.
Trade-off between Risk and Reward
Webster (2003) and Besley and Brigham (2007) give examples of
this. In essence, as was explained by Cattell (2012), a company's
risk profile reflects the perception their management has of the
acceptable trade-off between risk and the reward required to
compensate them for taking these risks. This technique can then be
used to predict such persons' certainty equivalence of a wider variety
of options. With this knowledge, one can determine a person's
indifference map (see Figure 2), taking account of different levels of
risk. An indifference map comprises as many as an infinite series of
indifference curves. Figure 2 shows an indifference map comprising
three indifference curves - each curve representing the contractor
deriving the same level of utility from alternative combinations of
expected return and risk. The theory is that a contractor should
prefer all options on curve J3 to all of those depicted on curve I2, and
so on. However, they should be indifferent as regards choosing any
of the options depicted on any one of these curves.
Figure 2 Indifference map, comprising 3 indifference curves, each
representing a constant level of utility
Figure 3 shows the indifference maps for two contractors, A and B.
In this instance, contractor B is showing that they are less risk-averse
than contractor A. For any given level of risk, contractor A has a
greater need for a higher return than contractor B, to compensate
them for taking on this degree of risk. Point 'X' shows the risk-free
rate of return that both A and B require, shared in common because
there is no risk involved (Besley and Brigham, 2007.)
If a contractor has had their risk profile assessed and if one then
knows their indifference map, then the knowledge of this can be
combined with that of a project's efficient frontier (that MPT has
provided) (Markowitz, 1990). In combination, one can then identify
the single (efficient) item pricing combination that represents the
contractor's optimal choice of pricing for a project, giving them a
greater utility than all other possible item prices (Besley and
Brigham, 2007). This is shown in Figure 4, where contractor A's
optimal portfolio is depicted as 'AT whereas contractor B's optimal
portfolio is 'A/'. Notice that contractor B will not only be deriving more
return from their optimal portfolio than contractor A, but also that
they will be accomplishing greater satisfaction (ie. utility) as well,
despite incurring greater risk.
Figure 4. Optimal Portfolio Selection
CONCLUSION
Contractors have need to assess their risk profiles if they are to take
advantage of new item pricing techniques such as those facilitated by
way of Component Unit Pricing (CUP) Theory. The benefits from
doing so have been identified as considerable, both from the
perspective of the potential increase in profits as well as from the
perspective of risk management. Contractors have, however, not
typically quantified or formally reviewed their attitude to risk vs.
return. It is proposed that Bayesian networking seems suited to
being used for this purpose and that this warrants further research.
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